文澜金融论坛（第270期）

摘要：

In this paper, we propose that a liquid labor market can discipline firm managers and make executive compensation schemes more efficient by pushing firms to compete in the labor market. We use the state-level staggered changes of noncompete agreement enforceability as the variation in labor market mobility and conduct DID estimation. Applying the textual analysis approach to capture managers’ attention to employees, we show that restricting labor market mobility makes firm managers care less about employees, leading to lower executive pay-for-performance sensitivity, pay-for-skill, and pay penalty. We also find institutional investors sell firm stocks if the firm fails to retain employees. These results suggest that the threat of losing employees in a liquid labor market imposes pressure on firm managers and pushes managers to accept more efficient compensation schemes. Further tests show that the impact of labor market mobility is more prevalent in firms relying more on skilled employees and firms in more competitive industries. The above evidence suggests that labor market mobility can serve as an external governance mechanism.

主讲人介绍：

陆瑶，清华大学经管学院金融系教授（长聘），副系主任。获得美国密歇根大学-安娜堡分校(University of Michigan -- Ann Arbor)罗斯商学院(Ross School of Business) 博士 Ph.D. in Business Economics。主要研究领域为公司治理，企业并购与重组，劳动与金融，技术变革对企业投融资以及发展的影响，资本市场改革与发展等。曾经在国内外顶级权威学术期刊发表（或接收）论文 46 篇。其中，包括《Journal of Finance》，《Management Science》，《Journal of Financial Economics》，《Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis》，《Review of Economics and Statistics》《Review of Finance》，《Journal of Corporate Finance》，《经济研究》，《管理世界》，《管理科学学报》,《金融研究》，《经济学（季刊）》等顶级国内外学术期刊。另外，她的多篇文章被哈佛大学公司治理论坛所收录。主持纵向研究课题 13 项。独立出版专著《公司并购与重组》。主要学术兼职包括：中国金融学会理事；担任《Journal of Comparative Economics》(SSCI) 副主编；《Pacific-Basin FinanceJournal》(SSCI)，副主编；《Corporate Governance: An International Review 》(SSCI)的编委会成员(Editorial Board）；《经济管理学刊》金融方向副主编。