基地研究员黄勇副教授的论文“Political incentives and corporate income tax: Evidence from China”在重要学术期刊Accounting & Finance发表。

摘要：We investigate how local politicians in China exploit their discretion in enforcing tax laws to enhance their prospects of promotion to higher offices. We find that non-state-owned enterprises (non-SOEs) tend to pay less income tax in the initial years after a new city leader assumes office, but this tax payment increases over the leader's tenure. Throughout city leaders' tenure, the income tax paid by non-SOEs shows an upward trend. This political turnover effect is more pronounced among non-SOEs incorporated in the administrative region of city leaders facing intensified peer competition and/or having a stronger incentive for promotion. By manipulating the intensity of tax enforcement over their tenure, city leaders create an upward trend in tax revenue to showcase their ability to generate sustainable fiscal revenue. Further analysis indicates that growing tax revenue over the tenure significantly increases the promotion prospects of city leaders. Overall, our findings suggest that local leaders strategically manipulate tax enforcement and revenue to enhance their prospects for promotion in contemporary China.

关键词：China; political promotion; tax avoidance

论文链接：https://doi.org/10.1111/acfi.13335

教师简介

黄勇，中南财经政法大学会计学院财务管理系副教授，日本九州大学经济学博士。主要研究方向为实证公司金融与行为公司金融。论文发表于Journal of Corporate Finance、International Review of Economics and Finance、International Review of Financial Analysis和Pacific-Basin Finance Journal等期刊。担任International Review of Economics and Finance、International Review of Financial Analysis、Pacific-Basin Finance Journal和Finance Research Letters等期刊匿名审稿专家，主持国家自然科学基金等课题。