基地研究员夏鑫副教授的论文“Optimal investment and financing with government subsidies under time to build”在重要学术期刊Economic Modelling发表。

摘要：This paper develops a real-options model that incorporates the game-theoretic interaction between firms and the government. We examine how government subsidies influence a firm’s optimal investment and financing decisions when accounting for time-to-build delays. Our findings indicate that subsidies induce leveraged firms to accelerate investment, albeit with a smaller investment scale and more conservative debt financing. Additionally, despite receiving fewer subsidies, leveraged firms tend to invest both earlier and at a larger scale than unleveraged firms. Furthermore, as subsidies become more effective at reducing time to build, investment is accelerated, leverage declines, and the optimal investment scale exhibits a U-shaped pattern. Lastly, compared to non-negotiated debt, the effect of negotiated-debt financing on optimal subsidies and investment scale depends on shareholders’ bargaining power. Our model offers novel and practical insights for policymakers designing effective subsidy programs and for managers formulating sound business strategies.

关键词：Government subsidies; Investment decisions; Time to build; Debt financing

论文链接：https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econmod.2025.107232

教师简介

夏鑫，中南财经政法大学金融学院副教授，主要研究方向为公司金融。近几年以第一作者或唯一通讯作者身份在《管理科学学报》、《中国管理科学》、《Journal of Corporate Finance》、《International Review of Economics and Finance》、《North American Journal of Economics and Finance》、《Economic Modelling》、《Applied Economics》、《Economics Letters》等学术期刊发表论文10余篇，担任多本SSCI期刊的审稿人。研究成果曾获得当代经济学博士创新项目资助。