基地研究员黄勇副教授的论文“Multiple large shareholders and cash holdings: Evidence from China”在重要学术期刊International Review of Financial Analysis发表。

摘要：We examine the governance role of multiple large shareholders (MLS) in the context of corporate cash holding policy. Using a sample of Chinese firms, we find strong evidence that the presence of MLS increases the level of cash holdings. This relationship is robust across alternative measures of key variables, model specifications, and identification strategies. The positive impact of MLS on cash holdings is more pronounced in firms with more investment opportunities, higher financial constraints, greater risk-seeking behavior, non-state control, better investor protection, and more related party transactions. Overall, the findings suggest that: (i) the large cash holdings of firms with MLS do not necessarily indicate the (in)effectiveness of MLS in corporate governance, and (ii) the presence of MLS ensures that the cash holdings of growth firms can be used in favor of large shareholders.

关键词：Multiple large shareholders; Corporate cash holdings; Agency problems

论文链接：https://doi.org/10.1016/j.irfa.2025.104180

教师简介

黄勇，中南财经政法大学会计学院财务管理系副教授，日本九州大学经济学博士。主要研究方向为实证公司金融与行为公司金融。论文发表于Journal of Corporate Finance、International Review of Economics and Finance、International Review of Financial Analysis和Pacific-Basin Finance Journal等期刊。担任International Review of Economics and Finance、International Review of Financial Analysis、Pacific-Basin Finance Journal和Finance Research Letters等期刊匿名审稿专家，主持国家自然科学基金等课题。