数字技术与经济金融学术午餐会（第29期）

摘要：

We develop a dynamic trade-off model to explore how shareholders' risk-taking incentives interact with firms' debt structure choices over the business cycle. The use of both bank and market debt exacerbates the ex-post risk-taking problem compared to relying solely on market debt, particularly under larger recessionary shocks. Macroeconomic risk amplifies the sensitivity of firms' debt structure decisions to shareholders' risk-taking incentives. Firms optimally increase their reliance on bank debt when facing lower systematic risk exposure, when confronted with larger recessionary shocks, or when macroeconomic conditions deteriorate. Finally, we find that macroeconomic risk is a critical factor in shaping the relationship between shareholders' bargaining power and firms' optimal debt structure decisions.

主讲人介绍：

夏鑫，中南财经政法大学金融学院副教授，经济学博士。目前主要研究方向为公司金融、资产定价和科技金融理论。以第一作者或唯一通讯作者身份在《管理科学学报》、《中国管理科学》、《Journal of Corporate Finance》、《European Financial Management》等国内外主流学术期刊发表论文多篇。研究成果曾获得当代经济学博士创新项目资助。目前主持一项国家自然科学基金青年项目。