数字技术与经济金融学术午餐会（第26期）

摘要：

This paper investigates how enhanced court enforcement within a pro-creditor legal framework influences corporate innovation. Leveraging the positive shock on court enforcement resulting from the staggered establishment of bankruptcy tribunals in China, we reveal a substantial increase in corporate innovation intensity. This effect is particularly pronounced for privately controlled firms and in regions with greater banking competition. We propose and examine three mechanisms to elucidate this effect: the enhancement of credit supply, increased risk tolerance among creditors, and the release of extensive credit from zombie firms through more liquidations. In addition to exploring within-firm outcomes, we assess distributive effects of the judicial reform in terms of firms’ innovation efficiency. Our findings indicate that firms with higher efficiency in transforming innovation input into output exhibit a greater number of patent applications subsequent to the reform. This study sheds light on the pivotal role of court enforcement in shaping real innovative activities.

主讲人介绍：

王亚男，中南财经政法大学金融学院副教授。复旦大学经济学院博士，德国WHU-Otto Beisheim School of Management联合培养博士生。主要研究领域为公司金融。目前主持国家自然科学基金青年项目一项，并参与多项国家自然科学基金和国家社会科学基金项目。研究成果发表于《经济研究》、《金融研究》、《数量经济技术经济研究》等国内重要期刊，以及Journal of Corporate Finance, Journal of Business Ethics, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, China Economic Review, Energy Economics, Journal of Business Finance & Accounting等SSCI期刊。