文澜金融论坛（第268期）

摘要：

We develop a dynamic tradeoff model that incorporates both controlling-minority shareholders conflict and shareholders-debtholders conflict to examine the relationship among agency conflicts, expansion investment, capital structure, and debt renegotiation. We show that balancing the two conflicts can eliminate agency conflicts in effect and simultaneously make the firm achieve the first-best expansion decision. Endowing the controlling shareholder with appropriate bargaining power in debt renegotiation can realize zero agency costs and make the firm's capital structure maximize the firm value.

主讲人介绍：

杨招军，南方科技大学金融系研究员、副教授，博士生导师，中国优选法统筹法与经济数学研究会量化金融与保险分会副理事长，中国运筹学会金融工程与金融风险管理分会常务理事。在国内外学术刊物发表了180余篇论文。主要研究方向是金融工程、公司金融理论及资产定价，当前主持一项国家自然科学基金重点项目。