文澜金融论坛（第355期）

摘要：

We study whether lower bank risk capacity—rather than explicit state directives—can reallocate credit toward state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in China. A simple model with ownership-specific screening shows that when volume targets bind and the risk capacity tightens, optimal screening thresholds shift: screening loosens for SOEs and tightens for non-SOEs, generating a flight to SOEs. We test this prediction using 2016–2021 loan-level data from a large joint-stock commercial bank. Exploiting the 2018 Asset Management Rules, which forced non-standard assets back on balance sheet, we find that more exposed branches subsequently increase the SOE share of new credit; the effect is stronger where volume pressure is tighter and safe opportunities are scarcer. We also provide complementary evidence from executive zodiac-year windows that reduce managerial tolerance and thus risk capacity within the same bank–executive pair; effects amplify in more superstitious regions, after branch-head rotations, and post-COVID. External validation with listed firms shows post-2018 declines in non-SOE borrowing and investment. Overall, lower risk capacity under binding volume targets yields an unintended, bank-driven resurgence of SOEs through ownership-based credit reallocation.

主讲人介绍：

朱菲菲，中央财经大学金融学院副教授，博士生导师；清华大学五道口金融学院资本市场与公司金融研究中心研究员，香帅数字经济工作室研究员。博士毕业于北京大学光华管理学院，系芝加哥大学访问学者。她目前在国内外高水平期刊上发表论文30多篇，包括《经济研究》、《管理世界》、《经济学（季刊）》、《管理科学学报》、《世界经济》、《金融研究》、《中国工业经济》、Journal of Financial Markets、Energy Economics等。主持国家自然科学基金项目2项，参与国家自然科学基金、国家社会科学基金若干项。主讲课程《商业银行经营学》获批国家级一流本科课程（线下）；共同参与的“金融安全工程与监管科技实验室”获评为“北京高等学校优秀本科教学实验室”；曾荣获北京市第十三届青年教师基本功比赛一等奖（第三名），最佳教案奖，最佳展示奖；中央财经大学第十四届青年教师教学基本功比赛一等奖（第一名）；2024年度中央财经大学“菁英学者”等。