文澜金融论坛（第347期）

摘要：

Conventional wisdom suggests that declining market friction improves the information con-tent of stock prices, strengthening managerial learning from the stock market. By incorporating material career risks following negative price reactions, we show that lowered trading friction may actually diminish stock price feedback. Lower market friction—by enabling stronger price reactions—incentivizes managerial information acquisition, substituting out feedback. In the presence of multiple dimensions of managerial information, career concerns—particularly from short-sale threats—can amplify strategic complementarity in information acquisition between speculators and managers along the dimension of speculator focus, at the cost of reduced managerial information production in other value-relevant dimensions. Our findings highlight the significance of features of managerial information acquisition in shaping how market friction alters firms’ economic efficiency.

主讲人介绍：

刘琦，北京大学光华管理学院金融学副教授，教育部青年长江学者。毕业于宾夕法尼亚大学沃顿商学院，获金融学博士学位。研究方向是公司金融，金融市场，和行为金融学。他的研究工作已发表在国内外学术期刊，如American Economic Review, Management Science, Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Review of Finance, American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 《金融研究》等。他的研究得到国家自然科学基金和北京大学的资助。他的研究成果曾获得过2024年金融街论坛年会论文二等奖，2022年中国国际风险论坛GARP优秀论文奖，第八届教育部高等学校科学研究（人文社科类）青年成果奖，2020年厉以宁科研奖，2018年中国金融学术年会最佳论文奖等。教学方面，曾获得过2016年正大奖教金、2020年曹凤岐金融教学优秀奖、2021年北京大学教学优秀奖和2024年中国工商银行奖教金（经济学优秀学者奖）等。