数字技术与经济金融学术午餐会（第7期）

Abstract:

Using a reform of state inspection of land (SIL) in China, this study explores the externalities of unleashing the local government's distortion on local land price with a difference-in-differences design. We present strong evidence that SIL leads substantial reduction of the price distortion in industrial land transactions, which results in an additional 50.0% increase of local land price and significantly improving the productivity of local industrial firms. Two plausible mechanisms are increased market competition and reduction of resource misallocation. By showing the negative externalities of the helping hand of local government, our findings suggest that market-oriented land prices can effectively select the high-productive entrants and impeding the investment of low-productive incumbents.

主讲人介绍：

王亚男，中南财经政法大学金融学院副教授。复旦大学经济学院金融学博士，德国WHU-Otto Beisheim School of Management联合培养博士生。主要研究领域为公司金融、合约理论以及行为金融。目前主持国家自然科学基金青年项目一项，并参与多项国家自然科学基金和国家社会科学基金项目。研究成果发表于《经济研究》、《金融研究》等国内重要期刊，以及Journal of Corporate Finance, China Economic Review, Energy Economics, Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, Economic Modelling, Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Finance Research Letters等SSCI期刊。