Abstract:

We show that conflicts of interest between shareholders and creditors affect stock prices through limits to arbitrage and short sales constraints. We use financial institution mergers as exogenous variation in the presence of dual holders -- institutions that hold equity and debt of the same firm -- to study how conflicts of interest impact asset prices. Firms with lower conflicts of interests exhibit higher equity lending supply, lower short sale constraints, and more efficient and less overvalued stock prices. Firms with more dual holders are also less likely to recall loaned shares prior to shareholder meetings. Our findings suggest that agency problems due to shareholder-creditor conflicts have a real impact on market efficiency and asset prices.

主讲人介绍：

褚勇强，北卡大学夏洛特分校贝尔克商学院Childress-Klein 讲席教授, Childress-Klein房地产中心主任，研究领域包括银行、房地产金融和金融机构及其相关领域。在Journal of Finance, Review of Financial Studies, Journal of Financial Economics， Management Science, Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Journal of Financial Intermediation, Journal of Corporate Finance, Quarterly Journal of Finance, Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics等国际顶级期刊发表文章30余篇。